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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated

§78-2-2(j) (1989 as amended),

and Article

VIII, Sections 3 and 4 of the Utah Constitution.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
time

to

Did the trial court err in failing to allow additional
conduct

discovery

in

accordance

with

Defendants/

Appellants1 Rule 56(f) Affidavit; and in failing to make findings
relative thereto?
2.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

granting

Plaintiff/

Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and specifically finding
that the Plaintiff/Respondent did not violate the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated §7-1-101 et seq. (1981 as amended)?
3.

Did

the

trial

court

err

on

dismissing

Defendants/

Appellants' Counterclaim as not stating a cause of action upon
which relief could be granted?
The standard of review for this Court when considering a
challenge to summary judgment granted in the lower court is well
settled and is as follows:
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and
deciding in whether the trial court properly granted
judgment as to a matter of law to the prevailing party,
we give no deference to the trial court's view of the
law; we review it for correctness.
1

Whatcott
4/4/90).
facts

v. Whatcott,

131 Utah Adv. Rpts.

97

(Utah Ct. App.

Additionally, this Court is obligated to review the

in the

light most

favorable to the party

against whom

summary judgment was granted. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P. 2d 281,
283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND CASE LAW
Appellants contend that there is one Rule of Civil Procedure
and two statutes which are dispositive of the issues raised on
appeal.
As it relates to the issue of whether or not the trial court
erred

in

granting

Defendant/Appellants'

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment on the pleadings and affidavits, Appellants believe that
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is dispositive.
The Rule states as follows:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated
present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained, or depositions to be taken,
or discovery to be had, or make such other orders as is
just.
As it relates to whether or not the trial court committed
error in granting summary judgment on the Plaintiff/Respondentfs
Complaint and in dismissing the Counterclaim, Utah Code Annotated
§7-1-702 is dispositive:

2

Other than a national bai ik, a federal savings bai ik, or
a savings and loan association lawfully using the words
" savi ngs bank" in its n a m e , and a u t h o r i z e d to do
business under Chapter 7, no person not authorized to
c o n d u c t the banking b u s i n e s s u n d e r C h a p t e r 3 m a y
transact business in this state under any name, or use
any name or sign, or circulate or use any letterhead or
bill head w h i c h c o n t a i n s the "bank", "banker", or
"banking", or any other word or combination of words
indicating that the business is the business of a
bank. Such a person may not advertise or represent in
any manner which indicates or reasonably implies that
its business is of the character or kind carried on by
a bank, or which is to likely to lead any person
reasonably to believe that it's business is that of a
bank or, in. the case of a federal or state savings
bank, that its business is other than that of a savings
bank. . . . (emphasis added).
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based upon a Promissory Note signed by the Defendant/Appellants.
The $100,000.00 represents loan fees charged by the Plaintiff/
Respondent

as

part

of

a

loan

provided

by

the

Plaintiff/

Respondent to the Defendant/Appellants to build a retail shopping
center.

The Defendant/Appellants

contend

that

the

Plaintiff/

Respondent is not entitled to collect under the note because of
the Plaintiff's violation of Utah banking
based upon the Plaintiff/Respondent's

laws and

explicitly

action in holding itself

out as a bank when it was not registered or licensed to so act
within
contend

the

State of Utah.

that

they were

Additionally,

damaged

by

the

Defendant/Appellants

Plaintiff/Respondent's

breach of contract and that they are entitled to recover the same
from the Plaintiff/Respondent.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
1.

1991

Plaintiff/Respondent filed its Complaint on January 10,

seeking

judgment

against

the Defendants/Appellants

based

upon a Promissory Note for the principal amount of $100,000.00,
together

with

interest,

Plaintiff/Respondent

costs

and

attorney's

fees.

also sought the same judgment against the

individual Defendants/Appellants

based upon their execution of

guarantees. (R. la-16.)
2.

The Defendants/Appellants prepared and filed an Answer

and Counterclaim on March 11, 1991. The Defendants/Appellants,
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6.
on April

Defendants/Appellants prepared and filed with the Court
16, 1991

opposition

to

the

a Memorandum

of Points and Authorities

Plaintiff/Respondent f s

Motion

for

in

Summary

Judgment and to dismiss Counterclaim with supporting affidavits.
Within the documents filed with the Court, Defendants/Appellants
sought additional time to conduct discovery. (R. 88-156.)
7.

Plaintiff/Respondent

filed

a

Reply

Memorandum

in

support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and to dismiss the
Counterclaim on April 23, 1991.
8.

(R. 157-168.)

As part of the Affidavit submitted in response to the

Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and
to Dismiss

Counterclaim,

counsel

for the

Defendant/Appellants

prepared and filed a Rule 56(f) Affidavit requesting additional
time to conduct discovery.
9.

(R. 147-150.)

Plaintiff/Respondent

filed

a Motion

to

Strike

the

Affidavits of I. N. Fisher and Gary J. Anderson on April 23,
1991. (R. 169-175.)
10.

The Court conducted oral arguments on August 14, 1991.

As a result thereof, the Court ruled from the bench by denying
the Plaintiff/Respondentfs Motion to Strike Affidavits, granting
Plaintiff/Respondentfs Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, based upon
the Court finding no issue of material fact.
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Plo^. i .* Moti.wn for Summary Judgment r-nd Mn»-ioa
to Dismiss Counterclaim are granted
3.
T h e f a c t s a l l e g e d in Plaints.nm in
support of i t s M o t i o n for Summary Ji iagr .i = i c c iu Motion
to Dismiss have not been denied by Defendants, and
therefore are admitted, and no genui ne issues of fact
exist.
4.
Based upon the admitted fac ts and the law, the
Court finds that the Plaintiff is n o t a bank n o r a
financial institution, and that if it were a bank o r
f i n a n c i a 1 i n s t i t u t i o n, P1 a i n t i f f i s n o t i n v i o 1 a. t i o n o f
t h e Utah F i n a n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n s A c t .
5.
Defendants1 Counterclaim f a i l s t o s t a t e a l e g a l l y
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can be
granted.
Defendants1 Counterclaim i s hereby dismissed
with
p r e j u d i c e and summary judgment a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t
is
h e r e b y o r d e r e d :i i i a c c o r d a n c e wi t h P1 a i n t i f f ' s
Complaint
(R
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III.

Appeal

in

this

case

was

filed

on

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL.
Defendant^ /Appel l a n N

submit

7

the

following

facts

as

- d

1.

As a result of a construction

Plaintiff/Respondent

committed

to

loan application, the

loan

to

the

Defendants/

Appellants the sum of $2,100,000.00 for the building of a retail
shopping center located at 300 East 6400 South in Salt Lake City,
Utah

containing

area.

The

approximately

total

loan

29,288

square

fees that were

feet of

to be

Plaintiff/Respondent consisted of $42,000.00.

leasable

charged

by

the

(See Construction

Loan Commitment Letter dated October 3, 1985, R. 106-117.)
2.

Subsequent

thereto, the Plaintiff/Respondent

changed

its position with regard to the amount of the fees to be charged
to

the

Defendants/Appellants

for

the

making

of

the

loan.

Attached to the Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, is
a

letter

signed

by

the

representatives

of

the

Plaintiff/

Respondent and representatives of the Defendants/Appellants under
which the loan fees associated with the financing were raised to
a

staggering

$144,000.00.

As

noted

in

Section

2 of

that

document, the $100,000.00 additional fee was termed "contingent"
and was to be due and payable upon the sale of the property,
refinancing of the loan, or at loan maturity as may be extended,
whichever comes first. (R. 118-19.)
3.

When the actual loan documents were actually prepared

and the transaction was closed between the Plaintiff/Respondent
and the Defendants/Appellants, the contingent $100,000.00 fee was

8

d i s g u j -o.-'.i.
loan

ilo.fi r.f

clorsi""
ava

i

*• '

? l .>: 00- ,01: :•: T • \- i n c l u d e d
>,j

documents

* rather,

undei

concealed

i ,•

t
< <<n f e e s "

as

part

of

the

the

monies

>

4.

0:\

rlo-v'rfj.

ilovonr t r

n(^p' •

28,

iyMi
w

lynrn

Umost

,/i

one

-Resident

hij^p- i".;« •

the Defendants/Appc 1 Lants indicating

',!... :cl;ter acknowl o ijoa, wa.q an

1

after

>'-

i si: u :

Group intended to -1 ^" from the

year

PlainUff-/

i ,•;, L:.;UI

•

f

"M<* bradford

ih,i

- — --oco^ds SI 00 o n O " n

UV.-LIJI:].

the

I.O

U

^---^

*_ .:• jr..jmg

of MiG project: by \ I'.1 P3 aLnti ff/Respondent..
5.

As evidenced

•• :

u

,l

21:/

Security
fi?

Ban:

' *

prciA-uds

^ Tiusl ^rr*

i i * ** '»* financ'no
r

"'

i ?i

Appellants.
Respondei it

-

The

,
only

anion.tits

•

$ 1i

'

6.

<..

ir-

; s c ~:,^i e n d a n t s /

I'.o

Plaintiff/

'

-* e

charged

Respondent for arranging the const i notion
above the $44,000.00 paid at th- 4~r

c(
' n

nUumc
i

_t

amount

a *. n L i i L, R e s p o n d e n t .

t h a fc \

a d d i t i o ii a 1

SeptemKrv- ° ,

*

Jetendants/Ap^uj.!... , O^L^. ,J^ _ ,

1

advanced

7

*'

f

,

•^ m

_ ; JV

Lh^L ua:, ;>ver am!

* — —:T.
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.uaor :.o

consumma be the long term financing with First Seci irity Bank, the

Defendants/Appellants were required to execute in favor of the
Plaintiff/Respondent a Promissory Note, Trust Deed, Unconditional
Guaranty,

and

Security

Agreement

executed

in

favor

of

the

Plaintiff/Respondent and the amount of $100,000.00 together with
interest.
7.

(R. 127-140)
As set out hereinabove, there is no question that the

$100,000.00 represented by the Promissory Note is for nothing
more

than

a construction

loan

fee charged

by the Plaintiff/

Respondent over and above the $44,000.00 paid at the time of
closing.
8.

Mr. I. N. Fisher, one of the Defendants/Appellants and

principals of the corporate Defendant/Appellants signed and filed
an Affidavit on April 22, 1991.
testified

that

The

Bradford

In the Affidavit, Mr. Fisher

Group,

the

Plaintiff/Respondent

herein, through its agents and employees, held itself out as a
banking organization

and its personnel

as bankers. Mr. Fisher

testified by way of affidavit that if the Court, as part of its
determination

awarded

the

Defendants/Appellants

the

costs,

interest and fees that they had paid to the Plaintiff/Respondent,
that

amount

would

equal

$468,986.53.

If

the

Court

granted

prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum as allowed by
statute, prejudgment interest on that amount to the time of the
filing of the Complaint would be an additional $158,213.44.
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As

noted

in

Mr.

Respondent, through

Fisher's

Affidavit,

the

Plaintiff/

its agents and employees, in addition to

holding themselves out as bankers, represented to the Defendants/
Appellants

that

The

Bradford

Group

was

the

source

of

the

$2,200,000.00, and further, that the Plaintiff/Respondent would
not

press

the

collection

of

the

$100,000.00

against

the

Defendants/Appellants, as long as the Defendant/Appellants were
moving forward in good faith to pay the same.

As recited in Mr.

Fisher's Affidavit, the negotiations and parties involved would
have been different if the Defendant/Appellants had known that
the Plaintiff/Respondent, instead of providing the loan proceeds,
was

simply

brokering

institutions.

the

loan on behalf

of

other

financial

The Defendants/Appellants would then know that the

Plaintiff/Respondent

had

no

right

or

authority

to

make

representations to the Defendants/Appellants that it would not
press

the

collection

of

the

$100,000.00.

Obviously,

the

Plaintiff/Respondent would not have any authority to extend the
$100,000.00 inasmuch as the money belonged to other
institutions.
9.

financial

(R. 151-56)

Plaintiff/Respondent

admits

the

word

"bank" and "banker" on its stationery and business cards.

(R.

49, 56)

11

that

it

used

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant/Appellants

contend

that the District

erred in granting summary judgment in this matter.

Court

First, the

Defendants/Appellants contend that the Court should have allowed
additional

discovery

relative

to the

issues outlined

in the

Plaintiff/RespondentTs Complaint and also, the issues raised by
the Defendants/Appellants in their Counterclaim.

The Appellants

contend that the Court's granting of summary judgment without
allowing additional discovery was error and in contravention of
Rule 56 and the interpreting case law.
Secondly, Appellants contend that on the merits, the Court
cannot grant judgment in favor of the Plaintiff/Respondent
the

$100,000.00

together

with

interest

and

attorney's

for
fees

because said amount represents loan fees as opposed to the actual
loan

proceeds.

The

Plaintiff/Respondent

Appellants

violated

contend

state statute

that
and

because

the

misrepresented

its status to the Defendants/Appellants, it should be barred from
receiving

any benefits

from that misrepresentation

payment of interest, costs, fees or the like.

by way of

The Defendants/

Appellants contend that although a person need not be licensed to
loan money to another person in this state, that the Plaintiff/
Respondent's

misrepresentation

12

as to

its

status

as

a bank,

warrants a forfeiture of the benefit of the arrangement with the
Defendants/Appellants.
Lastly,

the Defendants/Appellants

contend

that the

Court

erred in dismissing their Counterclaim* The Defendants/Appellants
contend that their Counterclaim is viable and states the cause of
action which relief should be granted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE ISSUES SURROUNDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT ALLOWING DEFENDANTS ADDITIONAL
TIME FOR DISCOVERY
As

outlined

contention

in

above,

this

case

it

is

that

the

the

Defendant/Appellants'

Plaintiff/Respondent,

in

contravention of state statute, held itself out as a "bank."

The

Defendants/Appellants

any

contend

that

the

statute

prohibits

entity who is not properly licensed and authorized, to make that
representation to the public.
contention
statute
forgoes

that

the Plaintiff/Respondent,

and misrepresenting
any

It is the Defendant/Appellants1

profit

misrepresentation.

it

by violating

its status to the general

might

obtain

by

virtue

state
public

of

the

In this case, the Plaintiff/Respondent was

repaid $2,100,000.00 and accordingly, any issue relating to the
payment of the principal of the loan was eliminated. What the
Defendant/Appellants

seeks by way of

13

these proceedings

is a

pronouncement by the Court that the $100,000.00 fee should be
forfeited

based

upon

the

Plaintiff/Respondent f s

statutory

violation and misrepresentation.
Obviously,

the

Defendants/Appellants

are

entitled

to

information from the Plaintiff/Respondent as to the governmental
entities

with

whom

it

was

licensed

and

registered.

The

Defendants/Appellants are also entitled to learn what advertisements and other representations were made to the general public
relative to its status.
The Defendants/Appellants,
that

the Plaintiff/Respondent

in their

Counterclaim

contend

affirmatively misrepresented

status as a "bank" to the Defendants/Appellants,

its

and further,

misrepresented to the Defendants/Appellants the source from which
the $2.2 million would be obtained. The latter representation was
very

significant

because

Plaintiff/Respondent

the

represented

agents
to the

and

employees

of

the

Defendants/Appellants

that as long as the Defendants/Appellants were moving forward in
good

faith

to

sell

the

shopping

complex,

that

appropriate

extensions would be given on the due date of the $100,000.00.

If

Defendants/Appellants had known that the Plaintiff/Respondent was
not in fact the person who loaned the $2.2 million, it would have
apparent to all that the Plaintiff/Respondent
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was without any

ability to represent when extensions would be granted concerning
the $100,000.00 Note.
Additionally, the Defendants/Appellants are clearly entitled
to discovery as to the identity of other financial institutions
who loaned the money used to finance the Defendants/Appellants'
loan.

The

Defendants/Appellants

are

entitled

to

know

the

contractual agreement between the Plaintiff/Respondent and third
party entities.

The Defendants/Appellants would also be entitled

to know what correspondence or dealings there were between the
Plaintiff/Respondent

and

third

party

extensions surrounding the $100,000.00.
be

appropriate

to determine

entities,

relative

to

Finally, discovery would

if the third

party

entities who

actually provided the money in this case, were made aware of the
dealings

between

the

Plaintiff/Respondent

and

Defendants/

Appellants, and the representations of the Plaintiff/Respondent
as to their status as a bank, and also as to extensions of time
to pay the $100,000.00.
As

detailed

Appellants

in the

Statement

sent Interrogatories

of

Facts, the Defendants/

and Request

for Production of

Documents. A copy of the Answers to Interrogatories and Response
to Request for Production of Documents are attached to this Brief
as the Addendum.
atories

clearly

A cursory review of the Answers to Interrogreveals

the

evasive
15

tactics

taken

by

the

Plaintiff/Respondent

in answering

Plaintiff/Respondentfs

the Interrogatories

failure to provide any real

and the

substantive

information in response to the Interrogatories.
Based upon the absence of the needed information, counsel
for Defendants/Appellants, Gary J. Anderson, filed a Rule 56(f)
Affidavit on April 16, 1991.
The Court, in scheduling arguments on the Motion for Summary
Judgment

and in its ruling on the pending motions, failed to

address the issues raised by counsel's Affidavit
argument

to the Court

that

conduct the needed discovery.

additional

and

explicit

time was necessary

to

(Anderson Affidavit, R. 147-150;

Argument relating to the need for additional discovery, R. 101105. )
A.

THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE APPROPRIATE FINDINGS ON THE
DISCOVERY ISSUE.
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as

follows:

Should i t a p p e a r from t h e a f f i d a v i t s of a p a r t y
opposing the motion t h a t he cannot for reasons s t a t e d
p r e s e n t by a f f i d a v i t e s s e n t i a l t o j u s t i f y h i s
opposition, the court may refuse the a p p l i c a t i o n for
j u d g m e n t o r may o r d e r a c o n t i n u a n c e t o p e r m i t
a f f i d a v i t s t o be obtained or depositions t o be taken,
or discovery t o be had, or may make such other order as
is just.
This Court and the Court of Appeals have ruled in a long
l i n e of cases t h a t

a case w i l l be reversed or remanded where
16

findings

were

inadequate

to

support

the

conclusions.

See

generally Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623, 626-27 (Utah 1987);
Smith v.

Smith,

726 P.2d

423, 426

(Utah

1986);

Marchant

v.

Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah App. 1987).
The

status

of

this

Defendant/Appellants

filed

record

is

that

counsel

for

the

a Rule 56(f) Affidavit, arguing by

affidavit and brief that summary judgment should not be granted
until additional time for discovery was allowed.

The record is

devoid of any ruling by the trial court relative to the issues
raised by the Rule 56(f) Affidavit.
that

Rule

56(f) of

the Utah

It is respectfully submitted

Rules of Civil

Procedure, when

implemented by the filing of an appropriate affidavit, requires a
ruling from the Court as to the status of discovery and a ruling
on the request for additional time.

The absence of a ruling on

the discovery request robs the Appellant of a chance to prepare
his case

and the

appellate

court is deprived

of the

factual

basis relied upon by the lower court.
B.

THE APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN ORDER REVERSING THE
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER THE
CONTINUATION OF DISCOVERY.
The Appellate Courts in Utah have been active with regard to

the right of the trial

court to grant

summary

judgment when

appropriate affidavits filed in accordance with Rule 56(f) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have been filed.
17

The Court of

Appeals dealt with the issue in Downtown Athletic Club v. S.N.
Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987). In addressing the issue,
the Court stated:
Generally, summary judgment should not be granted if
discovery is incomplete since information sought in
discovery may create genuine issues of fact sufficient
to defeat the motion.
Id. at 278.

See also Auerbach?s Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376,

377 (Utah 1977).
There are specific standards which the trial court should
apply in determining whether further discovery is appropriate
before

ruling

on

a motion

for

summary

judgment.

The

Utah

Supreme Court delineated those factors in Cox v. Winters, 678
P.2d 311, 313-14 (Utah 1984):
1. Were the reasons articulated in the Rule 56(f)
Affidavit "adequate", or is the party against whom
summary judgment is sought merely on a "fishing
expedition" for purely speculative facts after
substantial discovery has been conducted without
producing any significant evidence?
2.
Was there sufficient time since the inception
of the lawsuit for the party against whom summary
judgment is sought to use discovery procedures, and
thereby cross-examine that the moving party?
3.
If d i s c o v e r y p r o c e d u r e s w e r e
timely
initiated, was the non-moving party afforded an
appropriate response?
It is respectfully submitted that the discovery requested in
the Rule 56(f) Affidavit is entirely appropriate and relevant.
The Defendants/Appellants are clearly entitled to discover where
18

the monies lent to the Defendants/Appellants originated.
fact

is very

significant

in this matter.

The

That

Defendants/

Appellants will testify that the Plaintiff/Respondent agreed to
roll

over

the

$100,000.00

Note

as

long

as

the

Defendants/

Appellants were making reasonable efforts with regard thereto.
Had the Defendants/Appellants known that the money was actually
being loaned by a third party who could require the loan to be
paid

at

any

time

regardless

of

progress, Defendants/Appellants

the

would

Defendants/Appellants'
have

acted

differently.

Regardless, such would constitute a material misstatement of fact
entitling the Defendants/Appellants to damages. Corroboration of
the

dealings between

Appellants

could

the Plaintiff/Respondent

be

obtained

by

tracing

and Defendants/
the

Plaintiff/

Respondent's dealings with other entities at the same period of
time,

which

is also requested

in the

Rule

56(f) Affidavit.

Finally, facts relating to the representations made by the
agents

and

employees

of

the

Plaintiff/Respondent

to

the

Defendant/ Appellants with regard to its standing as a financial
institution is key to this matter inasmuch as the Court ruled as
a matter of law that the Plaintiff/Respondent was not a banking
institution and did not violate the Utah Financial Institutions
Act.
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If one reviews the three findings made by the trial court,
it is clear that the finding of the court did not even address
the Counterclaim and the need for further discussion.

The issue

as to whether "fees" may be recovered by an entity holding itself
out as a banking organization was not addressed; and further, the
alleged

misrepresentation

of

material

fact

claimed

in

the

Counterclaim was not even addressed. It is respectfully submitted
that Rule 56(f) clearly entitles the Defendant/Appellants to a
summary reversal of the Order of the District Court on the issues
raised by the Counterclaim.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENTTS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS COMPLAINT
A,

THE EXISTENCE OF ANY ISSUE OF FACT WARRANTS A REVERSAL OF
THE DISTRICT COURTTS GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The

standard

of

review when

considering

a challenge

to

summary judgment is well settled in Utah case law:
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and in
deciding whether the trial court properly granted
judgment as to a matter of law to the prevailing party,
we give no deference to the trial court's view of the
law; we review it for correctness.
Whatcott v. Whatcott, 131 Utah Adv. Rpts. 97 (Utah Ct. of App.
4/4/90), 98; see also Ceco Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc.,
772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989).
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Further, the Appellate Court is to review the facts in the
light most favorable to the losing party.

See Briggs v. Holcomb,

740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. of App. 1987); Whatcott v. Whatcott,
131 Utah Adv. Rpts. 97 (Utah Ct. of App. 1990); Phemy v. Segal
Enterprises, 595 P.2d
Commerce

526, 528-29

(Utah 1979);

Co. v. Washington Mutual

First American

Savings Bank,

66 Utah Adv.

Rpts 19 (Utah Ct. of App. 9/21/87); Blue Cross Blue Shield v.
State, 779 P.2d

634, 636 (Utah 1989).

Further, the Appellate

Court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusion.
Whatcott, supra, at 98; Bergen v. Travelers Insurance Co., 776
P.2d

659, 662 (Utah Ct. of App. 1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis

National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
In sum, summary judgment may only be sustained if there are
no genuine
entitled

issues of material

to judgment

Appellate Court.

fact

as a matter

and

of

the moving

law,

party

as viewed

by

is
the

See TransAmerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power,

789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990); Webb v. R.O.A. General, 152 Utah
Adv. Rpts. (Utah Ct. of App. 1991).
Finally,

as

it

relates

to

any

dispute

in the

evidence

itself, the district court has been explicitly instructed not to
waive or resolve disputed evidence.

Territorial Savings & Loan

Assoc, v. Baird, 781 P. 2d 452 (Utah 1989); Hardy v. Prudential
Insur. Co. of America, 763 P.2d
21

761, 765

(Utah

1988);

W. N.

Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah
1981).

As powerfully stated by the Court of Appeals in Lucky 7

Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. of App. 1988):
We liberally construe the facts and view the evidence
in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.
Id. Moreover, because a summary judgment is
granted as a matter of law rather than fact, we are
free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusion.
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229
(Utah 1987); Oberhansly, 751 P.2d at 156; K.O. v.
Denison, 748 P.2d 588, 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). After
reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to
appellant, if we conclude there is a dispute as to a
material issue of fact, we must reverse the trial
court's determination and remand for trial on that
issue.
Atlas, 737 P.2d at 229; Denison, 748 P.2d at
590.
It is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed
material facts in ruling on a summary judgment. Spor
v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304,
1308 (Utah 1987); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural
Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981); Oberhansly,
751 P.2d at 1156. It matters not that the evidence on
one side may appear to be strong or even compelling.
Spor, 740 P.2d at 1308; Oberhansly, 751 P.2d at 1156.
One sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to
dispute the averment on the other side of the
controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding the
entry of summary judgment. W.M. Barnes, 627 P.2d at 59,
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).
Id. at 752.
B.

THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT VIOLATE THE
PROVISIONS OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT OF 1981 (UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED §7-1-101 ET SEQ.), CONSTITUTES MANIFEST
ERROR.
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated,

amended) could not be clearer

§7-1-701

in prohibiting

(1981 as

any person

from

representing themselves as a banking organization without fully
22

complying with the statutes and regulations promulgated by the
Department of Financial Institutions.

Utah Code Annotated, §7-1-

701(1) (1981 as amended) states as follows:
It is unlawful for any person not authorized to conduct
a business subject to the jurisdiction of this
department to use a name, sign, advertisement,
letterhead, or other printed matter which represents,
or in any other manner to represent to the public that
that person, or place of business, is a financial
institution, or is conducting a business which is
subject to the jurisdiction of the department.
In paragraph

15 of

Plaintiff's

Statement

of

Undisputed

Material Facts in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
support

of

its Motion

for Summary

Judgment

(R. 49, 66), the

Plaintiff/Respondent acknowledges that in fact it held itself out
as a "realty investment banker."

The Affidavits of the Defendant

I.N. Fisher herein explicitly sets forth that not only was the
representation that the Plaintiff/Respondent was engaged as an
authorized
cards,

it

banker made by virtue of
was

representatives

also
of

part
the

of

the

stationery

and

"pitch"

made

P1aintiff/Respondent

business
by

the

to

the

Defendants/Appellants throughout the entire transaction.
The

seriousness

stationery

of using

the word

"bank" in

letterhead,

or in representations made to the public when the

entity is not a financial institution is demonstrated by Utah
Code Annotated, §7-1-701(2):
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Other than a national bank, a federal savings bank, or
a savings and loan association lawfully using the words
"savings bank" in its name and authorized to do
business under Chapter 7, no person not authorized to
conduct the banking business under Chapter 3 may
transact business in this state under any name, or use
any name or sign, or circulate or use any letterhead or
bill head which contains the word "bank", "banker", or
"banking", or any other word or combination of words
indicating that the business is the business of a bank.
Such a person may not advertise or represent in any
manner which indicates or reasonably implies that its
business is of the character or kind carried on by a
bank or which is likely to lead any person reasonably
to believe that its business is that of a bank or, in
the case of a federal or state savings bank, that its
business is other than that of a savings bank. . . .
(emphasis added)
See also Utah Code Annotated §7-3-2(2) (1989 as amended).
The Plaintiff, in response, contended that it was not a bank
and not subject to the provisions of the Financial Institutions
Act.

The trial court in its findings found that the Plaintiff/

Respondent

was not

a banking

institution.

The error of the

District Court is apparent. The clear meaning and intent of the
Financial Institutions Act is to keep entities and persons who
were not in fact banks and bankers, and thereby subject to the
Financial Institutions Act, from holding themselves out as banks,
bankers or mortgage bankers and thus deceive the public.

There

is no dispute in the evidence that the Plaintiff/Respondent in
fact held

itself out

"bank"

its

in

discussions

as a mortgage banker

letterhead,

with

the

and used

cards, advertisements

Defendant. Accordingly,
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the

the term

and

in

its

Plaintiff/

Respondent violated the Utah Financial Institutions Act when in
fact it was not a financial institution subject to the provisions
of

the Utah

Statute.

It is impossible

and

contrary

to the

evidence to hold that the Plaintiff/Respondent was neither a bank
thereby not subject to the Financial Institutions Act; find that
the

Defendant

used

"bank"

in

its

name

and

that

its

representatives held the organization out as a bank and yet not
find that the Defendant violated the Utah Financial Institutions
Act.
The Defendants' theory with regard to the Utah
Institutions Act is simple.

The Act specifically

Financial

forbids any

person or entity to use terms such as "bank", "banker", "mortgage
banker" when it in fact is not an entity regulated by the Utah
Financial Institutions Act.
protect

the

public

from

The purpose of the legislation is to
persons

or

entities

who

represent

themselves as financial institutions, when in fact they are not.
It

is

inconceivable

that

the District

Court

could

hold,

in

accordance with the Affidavits and admissions of the Plaintiff,
that the Plaintiff's agents and employees represented itself as a
bank, while not actually being a bank governed by the Financial
Institutions Act, and yet did not violate the Utah

Financial

Institutions Statute. The Utah Financial Institutions Act, Utah
Code Annotated §7-1-101 et seq. has two purposes.

25

The first is

to proscribe

the use of terms

such

as

"bank",

"banker"

and

"mortgage banker" and avoid misrepresentation to the public, and
secondly,

to

institutions

properly
who

control

properly

may

entities
be

called

that

are

banks

or

in

fact

financial

institutions.
There is only one provision within the Act that would allow
a person to use terms used by the Plaintiff/Respondent and not be
in violation of the Act.

Utah Code Annotated

§7-1-701(8)(a)

states:
Notwithstanding any other restriction in this section,
the prohibition of the use of specific names and words
in subsection (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) does not apply
if the effect of the use of the name or word would not
likely lead any person reasonably to believe that a
person or his place of business is a financial
institution, or is conducting a business subject to the
jurisdiction of the department.
The statutory language outlined above was to clarify the
intent of the legislation and make sure that the persons who use
phrases such as "food bank", or "blood bank" are not drawn within
the legislative scheme.

As applied to the facts of this case,

the Plaintiff's agents and employees represented themselves as a
financial institution and the Defendants/Appellants clearly fall
within the persons sought to be protected by the Act.
C.

THE CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE UTAH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT
PROHIBITS THE PLAINTIFF FROM SEEKING TO COLLECT FEES FROM
THE DEFENDANT AND THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO SO FIND
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The

leading

case

dealing with implied

civil claims

from

statutes or regulations with specific remedies other than civil
remedies is Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1974).
Supreme
private

In that case, the

Court dealt with the question of whether
claim

was

implied

from

a

specifically provided a criminal penalty.

federal

a civil or

statute

that

In determining whether

a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing
one, the Court stated as follows:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in
a statute not expressly providing one, several factors
are relevant.
First, is the plaintiff "one of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted," [citing case] - that is, does the statute
create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
Second,
is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
[citing cases] Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy
for the plaintiff? [citing cases] And finally, is the cause
of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the states so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law? [citing cases and authority]
Id. at 78.

See

also Wyandotte

Transportation

Co. v. United

States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-202 (1967); see also J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964); Texas and Pacific R. Co. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
The subsequent decisions, the United States Supreme Court
has reaffirmed the four tests outlined above. However, the more
recent cases establish that Cort, supra did not determine "that
each of the factors is entitled to equal weight.
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The central

inquiry

remains whether

Congress

intended

to create,

either

expressly or by implication, a private cause of action."

Touch

Ross and Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575, 99 S.Ct. 2479,
2489,

61 L. Ed. 2d 82, 96

(1979);

see also Middlesex

County

Sewage Authority v. National C. Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1,
13,

101

S.

Ct.

2615, 2622,

69

L.

Ed.

2d

435, 446

(1981);

Universityfs Research A s s o c , Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770,
101 S. Ct. 1451, 1461, 67 L. Ed 2d 662, 675 (1981).
In determining whether Congress intended to create a private
remedy, the Supreme Court has held that: "the failure of Congress
expressly

to

consider

a private

remedy

is

not

inevitably

inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy
available."

Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444

U.S. 11, 18, 100 S. Ct. 242, 246, 62 L. Ed. 2d 146, 154 (1979).
The intent to make the remedy available may appear "implicitly in
the language or structure of the statute, or in circumstances of
its enactment."
Before

Id.

addressing

the

specific

tests outlined

in Cort,

supra,, it should be noted that generally, courts imply a private
cause of action based upon a continuous line of decisions in the
Supreme Court of the United States providing for civil actions by
private persons based upon violations of penal statutes. The Utah
Financial Institutions Act, upon which the Defendants/Appellants
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base their defense makes the violation a crime. See Wandotte,
supra.
As to the first question raised in Cort, supra, whether or
not the Defendants/Appellants herein constitute one of the class
for whose benefit the statute was enacted, reference should be
made to the legislative findings and intent which is contained in
Utah Code Annotated, §7-1-102 (1981 as amended).

In subpart A

thereof, it is stated:
The legislature finds that it is in the public interest
to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and
e x a m i n a t i o n of p e r s o n s , f i r m s , c o r p o r a t i o n s ,
associations and other business entities furnishing
financial services to the people of this state, or
owning and controlling those businesses.
Accordingly, it is the purpose of this title to expand
and strengthen the duties, powers and responsibilities
of the Department of Financial Institutions and to place
under its jurisdiction all classes of institutions and other
businesses engaged in furnishing financial services to the
people of this state, or owning or controlling those
businesses. . . .
Utah Code Annotated, §7-1-102(1)(A).
Utah

Code Annotated,

§7-1-701 cannot

be

interpreted

any

other way than designating the public as the primary party to be
protected by the statute, requiring representations of financial
institutions to be restricted and controlled by the statutes and
regulations
Institutions.

promulgated
It

by

the

is obvious

that

Department

of

Financial

allowing

anyone

to

hold

themselves out as a financial institution, when in fact they were
not authorized to do so, would both undermine the credibility
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that

the

public

has

in

the

banking

industry,

and

opportunity for criminal exploitation of the public.

create

The Loran

Corporation and its principals are members of the general public,
dealing with entities who represented themselves to be regulated
and authorized financial institutions which the statute clearly
seeks to protect.
The second aspect of the Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, criteria is
whether there is an indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, to create or deny a remedy.

Violation of the Utah

Financial Institutions Act is, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
§7-1-701(9) a Class A Misdemeanor. Utah Code Annotated
201(2) relating

§76-3-

to the province of the court in sentencing a

violator of the criminal situation, states as follows:
This chapter does not deprive the court of authority
conferred by law to forfeit property, dissolve the
corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit
the removal of a person from office, cite for contempt
or impose any other civil penalty. A civil penalty may
be included in a sentence. (emphasis added)
There

is

absolutely

nothing

in

the

statutory

scheme

encompassed in the Financial Institutions Act of 1981 that would
preclude

any

statute.

It is further clear that the statute clearly intends to

set

forth

kind

the

of

civil

protocol

remedy

for

the

for the violation

regulation

of

of

the

financial

institutions, and thereby establish the duty that an entity has
in order to represent itself as a bank.

Implicit therein, is an

attempt by the legislature to define and set the standard for
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individuals

or

entities holding

themselves

out

as

financial

institutions•
The United States Supreme Court dealt with the same issue in
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of
New York, 463 U.S. 582, 103 S.Ct. 3221 (1983).

In that case, the

court noted that government enforcement alone is not a sufficient
deterrent
noted

against unlawful

that

sanction,
violate

regardless

that

the

the

law

of

the

individual

and

compensatory relief.

and improper behavior.

can

alternative
acts

of

effectively

The

administrative

discrimination
only

court

be

still

remedied

by

The court noted that any other approach to

the subject could only encourage continued acts of bad faith and
to stall private litigants in the knowledge that justice delayed
would be justice denied.
The third test is whether or not a civil cause of action is
consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme.
It is respectfully submitted that implying such a remedy for the
Defendant
wrongfully
purpose

in

a case

held

of the

Appellants

dealing

itself

which

has

out to be a "bank", does fulfill

the

regulatory

herein

to void

with

statute.

the

corporation

Allowing

the contractual

the Defendants/

obligation

to

the

Plaintiff/Respondent of paying fees to an entity violating the
statute does prevent the dangers of a corporation from obtaining
benefit from its exploitation and violation of the Utah statutory
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scheme.

On

illegally

the other hand,

and

improperly

allowing

represented

a corporation
itself

as

a

who

has

financial

institution to retain the profits from that activity would be an
affront to the entire statutory and legislative scheme created by
the state.
See Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 102 S.Ct.
2540 (1982).
Finally, it should be noted that in Cort, 422 U.S. at 78,
the Court was asked to enforce an implied civil right of action
where

the

state

statutes

specifically

provided

a

remedy.

Obviously, in the present case, we are only dealing with a state
statute that is applicable, and therefore, there is no conflict
between state and federal law.
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that a civil cause
of action is in fact created by the statute, and considering the
Plaintiff's violation of the statute, the

Plaintiff/Respondent

should be barred from collecting any profits associated with its
improper and illegal activity.
D.

THE CONTRACT AND NOTE BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS
FOR BANKING OR LOAN FEES IS VOID.
Aside from the issues outlined above as to the creation of a

civil cause of action from a statutory scheme, secondary sources
and

courts

interpreting

contracts entered

the

issue

generally

have

held

into in connection with illegal banking

void.
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that
are

The Plaintiff, in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion
for

Summary

Judgment,

cites

one

case,

Shepherd

v.

Associates of Auburn, 316 N.E. 2d 597 (Mass. 1974).

Finance
In that

case, it is true that the Supreme Court in fact refused, under
the statutory scheme then in effect to void a private transaction
on the basis of the violation of the banking law.

However, the

great weight of authority of cases dealing with the issue clearly
indicates that the violation of the statute relating to banking
voids

the

transaction.

Most

cases

in

which

there

is

a

distinction, the Court has held that the violation of the banking
act does not void the obligation to repay loan amounts, but does
in fact void any contract between the debtor and the creditor
relating to fees, interest and the like.
One of the first cases discussing the issue is Koven v.
Cline, 245 A.D. 307, 280 N.Y.S. 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935).

In

that case, the court held explicitly that under the state of the
law, that:
this assumption disposes of appellant's
contention that there may be no recovery because of the
violation by the corporation, Section 140 of the
Banking Law. Such a violation would render the note
void, but there could be a recovery for money loaned,
or money had and received. [Citing case].
In the Voluntary Association v. Goodman, 244 N.Y.S. 328, 137
Misc. 388 (Mun. Ct. 1930), the court held that:
The undisputed facts are that the plaintiff, a
membership corporation, with no banking powers is
engaged in the business of mutual banking in a manner
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permitted only to credit unions, without having
complied with the banking law and consequently, all
notes received by it for loans made by it are made void
by Section 140 of the Banking Law.
Id. at 331.
In Wonock Enterprises Corporation v. Berg, 151 N.Y.S. 2d
241, 87 Misc. 544 (Sup. Ct. 1955), the Supreme Court for New York
County stated:
Furthermore, the transaction between Air-tite and
plaintiff shows that there was not an unconditional
sale of the acceptances.
Plaintiff calls the
transaction "the sale with recourse." Every sale of a
negotiable instrument is with recourse unless otherwise
specifically noted. Yet, in every sale there is no
right in the purchaser to require a new security.
It
would appear that the practice of the parties here
amounted in fact to a loan on the strength of
acceptances (not necessarily those conveyed), rather
than a purchase of any specific acceptances, and this
practice being habitual, is evidenced by the contract,
is a violation of the banking law. Collection of the
instruments by the holder acting in violation of that
law is prohibited. [Citing cases].
Id. at 243.
As outlined above, some courts have used statutory schemes
to void contracts and others have used the development of common
law.

The most recent approach is that violations to banking laws

is not a defense to the actual loan monies lent to a borrower by
an

institution,

but

as

it

relates

to

contracts

with

that

institution, including interest, loan fees, extension fees and
the

like,

the

arrangements

violation

entirely.

Plaintiff/Respondent

of

the

Following
in

this
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banking

laws

the reasoned
action

has

voids

those

approach, the

been

paid

the

$2,100,000.00 of

loan monies and should now repay to the

Defendant the interest, late fees, extension fees and attorney's
fees previously collected by it and further be barred from
pursuing the $100,000.00 brokerage fee which is the gravamen of
the Plaintiff's Complaint.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION
UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED

As o u t l i n e d hereinabove, the Counterclaim seeks damages from
the Plaintiff/Respondent

based upon two separate t h e o r i e s .

The

f i r s t theory i s t h a t the Plaintiff/Respondent held i t s e l f out as
a

bank

in

direct

misrepresentation
contend

that

collecting

violation
of

its

statute.

status,

the

Based

upon

should be b a r r e d

interest,

expenses

contend t h a t

fees
In

and

other

the

Defendants/Appellants

the Plaintiff/Respondent

Defendants/Appellants.
Appellants

of

words,

based upon the

the

from

from
the

Defendants/

Plaintiff/Respondent's

misrepresentation as t o i t s banking s t a t u s , the Court should not
allow them t o r e a l i z e any p r o f i t from t h a t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
The second theory i s t h a t the agents and employees of the
Plaintiff/Respondent

misrepresented

the

source

of

the

loan

proceeds t o the Defendants/Appellants, and f u r t h e r misrepresented
the a b i l i t y of the Plaintiff/Respondent

t o forego c o l l e c t i o n of

the $100,000.00 as long as the Defendants/Appellants were making
good f a i t h e f f o r t s t o s e l l the complex.
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In

the

Respondent

argument
contended

in
only

front

of

Judge

Lewis,

Plaintiff/

that the Defendants/Appellants

were

precluded from going forward on the Counterclaim based upon the
extension agreements they had signed with the Plaintiff.
The fact that the Defendants/Appellants executed extension
agreements

does

not

nullify

the

fraudulent

pre-contract

representations made by the Plaintiff/Respondent with regard to
the

loan

itself

generally.
granting

of

and

the

nature

of

the

Plaintiff/Respondent

The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial courts'
summary

judgment

in the matter of Union Bank v.

Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).

In that case, the court

stated:
This general rule was stated contains an exception for
fraud.
Parol evidence is admissible to show the
circumstances on which the contract was made for the
purpose for which the writing was executed. This is so
even after the writing is determined to be an
integrated contract. Admitting parol evidence in such
circumstances avoids the judicial enforcement of a
writing that appears to be a binding integration, but
in fact is not.
What appears to be a complete and
binding integrated agreement may be a forgery, a joke,
a sham, or an agreement without consideration, or it
may be voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or the
like, or it may be illegal. Such invalidating causes
need not and commonly do not appear on the face of the
writing.
Id. at 665.

See also Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos,

607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980); Hot Springs National Bank v. Stoops,
613 P.2d 710 (New Mexico 1980).
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The Supreme Court further made it clear in Colonial Leasing
Company of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Construction, 713
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), that the issue relating both to the precontract discussions and the written document is a question to be
decided by the trier of fact:
Only when contract terms are complete, clear and
unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a
motion for summary judgment [citing cases].
If the
evidence is to the terms and agreement are in conflict,
the intent of the parties as to the terms of the
agreement are to be determine by the jury [citing
cases].
Id. at 488.
The importance of the underlying factual issues in this case
are demonstrated by the Affidavit of the Defendant Irv Fisher.
The Plaintiff/Respondent
banking

in this case represented

organization.

Further,

the

itself

as a

Plaintiff/Respondent

represented that it was the entity that would in fact make the
loan when, upon information and belief, it is alleged that the
Plaintiff/Respondent in fact brokered a loan using Dino Bank and
another

bank

in

Idaho.

The

Plaintiff/Respondent

made

representations relative to the fact that it would work with the
Defendants/Appellants

with

regard

to

the

payment

of

the

$100,000.00 loan, and although specific documents were executed
extending the loans to a day certain, it was also explained to
the Defendants/Appellants that the Plaintiff/Respondent would in
fact work with the Defendants/Appellants in the payment of the
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$100,000,00

based

upon

set

criteria.

If

the

Defendants/

Appellants had known that the Plaintiff/Respondent in fact was
not the person who would be controlling the money and the demand
therefore,
entities

the

Defendants/Appellants

to procure

the money

could

have

from or different

used

other

negotiation

strategy regarding the contracts surrounding the $100,000.00.
In other words, if the Court found for any reason that the
$100,000.00 was in fact collectible, there is still a fact issue
regarding

the representations made by the

Plaintiff/Respondent

prior to the initiation of the contracts, which issues need to be
resolved by the trier of fact.
One last point should be made.

Even if the Court decided

that the statutory language within the Financial Institutions Act
did not create a private cause of action, the Court would still
need

to

resolve

representation

of

the

issue

itself

of
as

whether
a

bank

or

and

not
the

the

bank's

surrounding

representations concerning the contract, violated the Plaintiff/
Respondent's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
whether or not there was a violation of the fiduciary duty the
Plaintiff/Respondent has to the Defendants/Appellants.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court committed
error in failing to honor the Rule 56(f) Affidavit as it relates
to the

Counterclaim,

and

further, even based upon the
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facts

before

the

relates

trial

court, in granting

to the Counterclaim.

summary

judgment

Secondly, the undisputed

as

it

facts

before the Court clearly indicate that the Plaintiff/Respondent
in fact held itself out as a bank and mortgage banker and such
characterization

is

a

violation

of

the

Utah

Financial

Institutions Act, voiding the right of the Plaintiff/Respondent
to recover fees from the Defendants/Appellants.
Based upon the standard of review enunciated by the Supreme
Court, there are genuine issues of fact as it relates both to
the Plaintiff's Complaint and the Counterclaim of the Defendants/
Appellants which
reversal

of

should

be remanded

for trial

the Court's Order granting

summary

and justify a
judgment

and

dismissing the Defendants' Counterclaim.
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should reverse
the

Order

of

the

trial

court granting

summary

judgment

and

dismissing the Counterclaim, and remand the matter for discovery
and trial.

The Defendants/Appellants also request that the Court

rule as a matter of law that the violation of the Utah Financial
Institutions Act creates a private cause of action and allows the
Court to void the contract between the Plaintiff/Respondent and
Defendants/Appellants as it relates to costs, interest, fees and
expenses.

DATED this <f\

day of February, 1992.
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'ANDERSON, ESQ.
fey for Defendants/Appellants
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Addendum: Answers to Interrogatories
Response to Request for Production of Documents

ADDENDUM

RICHARD G. ALLEN (A0042),
CRAIG L. TAYLOR (A4421) and
STEPHEN C. TINGEY (A4424) of
RAY, QUINNEY St NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OOOoo
BRADFORD GROUP WEST, INC.,
Plaintiff,

:
:

v.

ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES

:

JAMES F. KERN, an individual,
I.N. FISHER, an individual,
and LORAN CORPORATION, a
California corporation,

:

Civil

No. 910900291CV

:

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.
ooOoo
Plaintiff Bradford Group West, Inc. answers Defendants'
First Set of Interrogatories as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1
As it relates to the $100,000.00 referred to in
paragraph 6 of the Plaintiff's Complaint, state specifically where
that $100,000.00 was shown on any of the documents executed
between the Plaintiff and the Defendants relating to the
Construction Loan Agreement dated December 4, 1985.

ANSWER:

The 1988 $100,000 Note does not relate

specifically to any fee or particular disbursement on the 1985
construction loan and therefore, is not referred to in any way in
the 1985 construction loan documents.

The $100,000 Note referred

to in Plaintiff's Complaint came about at the specific request of
defendants and was accepted in 1988 as payment for the shortfall
between the amount owed by SLC Limited IV on the construction loan
and the amount funded by First Security Bank on its permanent,
take-out loan on the Center Pointe project.

INTERROGATORY NO. 2
As it relates to any action undertaken by the Plaintiff
with regard to the Construction Loan Agreement dated December 4,
1985, state the specific basis upon which the Defendants were
charged the $100,000,00.
ANSWER:

As stated above, the $100,000 Note referenced in

Plaintiff's Complaint represents the shortfall between the amount
owed to Plaintiff on the construction loan and the amount funded
by First Security Bank on its permanent, take-out loan.
Therefore, the $100,000 represents unpaid construction loan
proceeds for which Plaintiff agreed to accept the Note so that
Defendants could obtain the permanent, take-out financing.
Assuming Defendants' Interrogatory No. 2 refers to a
$100,000 fee charged in connection with the construction loan,
-2-

that fee was negotiated in connection with the construction loan.
As part of the construction loan, SLC executed a "Second Mortgage
Endorsement to Construction Loan Commitment" in which SLC agreed
to pay a $100,000 fee in relation to the construction loan,
payable on the earlier of the sale or refinance of the Center
Pointe project or the maturity of the construction loan
INTERROGATORY NO, 3
State each and every term identified within the Bylaws,
Articles of Incorporation, Amended Articles of Incorporation,
Amended Bylaws, Minutes, Stock Certificates, Stock Transfer
Ledger, Resolutions, and on all corporate documents of the
Bradford Group, Inc., or in the alternative, attach all such
copies to your Answers to these Interrogatories.
ANSWER;

Plaintiff agrees to produce a copy of its

Articles of Incorporation and its Bylaws at a mutually convenient
time and place. To the extent this Interrogatory seeks additional
information, Plaintiff objects on the basis that the Interrogatory
is vague and unintelligible and overbroad.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4
Identify each and every federal and state agency with
whom the Bradford Group has registered from 1985 to the present
date.

With regard to each such entity, state the following:
a.

State the name, address and file or case number,

if applicable;
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b.

State specifically the date of the registration;

c.

State specifically the title, status, license,

or registrations sought;
d.

Identify the date of the response from the

federal or state agency;
e.

Identify all documents in your possession which

evidence your answer to these Interrogatories,
ANSWER:

Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the

basis that it is vague and ambiguous.

Plaintiff makes numerous

filings with state and federal agencies in relation to income
taxes, business taxes, unemployment taxes and other
responsibilities common to most corporations and employers.

In

addition, Plaintiff is licensed by the State of Nevada as a
mortgage company.

Plaintiff agrees to produce its files and

records in relation to this license at a mutually convenient time
and place.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5
Without limiting the generality of the prior
interrogatory, state specifically whether the Bradford Group has
ever filed or registered with the Utah Department of Financial
Institutions.

If you claim that you have filed or registered with

that agency, state the following:
a.

State the date of the registration;

b.

State the specific contents of any registration

documents;
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c.

State whether or not you are in fact registered

or certified with the Department of Financial
Institutions, and if so, state the date thereof;
d.

Identify all documents in your possession which

evidence your answer to these Interrogatories.
ANSWER:

No filing has ever been required or made.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6

State specifically the authority the Plaintiff obtained
to use the words "bank", "banker", or "banking" in association
with its names and on its letterhead and associated documents.
ANSWER:

Plaintiff uses the term "realty investment

banker" in its correspondence to identify its business. No
authority to use that term is necessary other than Plaintiff's
authority to do business as a corporation in the State of Utah.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7
As it relates to the business transaction between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant from the date of the construction loan
documents of December 4, 1985 to the present, state the following:
a.

Identify all monies collected from the Defendant

relating to loan origination fees, extension fees, legal
fees, late charges, and interest relating to any said
fees which the Defendants have paid and state the
following:
b.

State the date of the payment;
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c.

State the amount of the payment;

d.

State specifically the Plaintiff's construction

of that charge, legal fee, construction loan fee,
extension fee or the like;
e.

Identify all documents in your possession which

evidence your answer to these Interrogatories.
ANSWER:

The answers to this Interrogatory may be derived

from the business records of Plaintiff, and the burden of deriving
such answers is substantially the same for the Defendants as it is
for Plaintiff.

Plaintiff elects and agrees to produce the payment

records relating to the construction loan at a mutually convenient
time and place.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8
As it relates to all advertising of any type or nature
undertaken within the State of Utah from 1985 to the present,
state the following:
a.

State specifically the medium through which the

advertising was distributed, newspaper, magazine,
mailing, etc.
b.

State the content of each and every

advertisement;
c.

Identify all documents in your possession which

evidence your answer to these Interrogatories;
d.

State the name, address and telephone number of

the entity who prepared the advertisement, or who has
-6-

custody of the documents relating to the specific
contents of the advertisement.
ANSWER:

Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the

basis that it is overbroad.

Additionally, Plaintiff objects on

the basis that the request for advertising is vague and
ambiguous.

Plaintiff has placed magazine advertisements on two

occasions in the last eleven years.
copies of this advertising.

Plaintiff agrees to produce

No other advertising has been

distributed by Plaintiff.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9
With regard to all transactions entered into by the
Plaintiff in the State of Utah from 1985 to the present in which
the Plaintiff has used the term "bank", "banker", or "banking" in
association with its name, on its letterhead and in its
advertisement, state the following:
a.

State the names, addresses and telephone numbers

of the principals with whom the Plaintiff dealt;
b.

State specifically the property location

associated with the transaction;
c.

State the name, address and telephone number of

the person who is the custodian of the records of the
Plaintiff relating to that transaction.
ANSWER:

Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory as being

overbroad and burdensome and not designed to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
-7-

is 2t day of March, 1991.

DATED thi

AS TO OBJECTIONS:
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

CfllA
£
G. Allen

Richard
Craig L. Taylor
Stephen C. Tingey
Attorneys for Plaintiff

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

ss

John A. Clawson, being duly sworn, deposes and says that
he is the President of Bradford Group West, Inc., that he has read
the foregoing Answers to Interrogatories and knows the contents
thereof, that the same are true of his own knowledge, and that he
is authorized to sign this verification on behalf of Bradford
Group West, Inc.

BRADFORD GROUP WEST, INC.

-8-

L

is 23i
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this
*~l

>day

of March,

1991,

A

My Commission E x p i r e s :

U AAz,

Notary ^ubl(
R e s i d i n g a t " S a l t Lake C i t y - ^ U t a h

SCT+1293
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RICHARD G. ALLEN (A0042),
CRAIG L. TAYLOR (A4421) and
STEPHEN C. TINGEY (A4424) of
RAY, QUINNEY Sc NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
79 South Main Street
P. O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OOOoo
BRADFORD GROUP WEST, INC.,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v.
JAMES F. KERN, an individual,
I.N. FISHER, an individual,
and LORAN CORPORATION, a
California corporation,

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

:
:

Civil

:

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

No. 910900291CV

Defendants.
ooOoo
Plaintiff Bradford Group West, Inc. responds to Request
for Production of Documents as follows:
REQUEST NO. 1
All documents referenced in Defendants' First Set of
Interrogatories.
RESPONSE:

Plaintiff objects to this request (i) to the

extent that such request seeks the disclosure of privileged
attorney-client communications; and (ii) to the extent that such

request seeks the disclosure of privileged work product as defined
by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26.

Subject to the foregoing

objection, Plaintiff agrees to produce all discoverable,
responsive documents in its possession,
REQUEST NO. 2
All documents of every type or nature within your
possession which relate to the transaction with the Defendant from
the execution of the construction loan documents on December 4,
1985 to the present. Without limiting the generality of the
request, specific request is made for all contracts, attachments,
notes, trust deeds, guarantees, correspondence, files,
inter-office memoranda or work papers.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Request No. 1 above.
REQUEST NO. 3

All documents within the Plaintiff's possession relating
to the loan arrangements with the Defendant originating with the
Loan Agreement dated December 4, 1985 and as it specifically
relates to monies the Plaintiff obtained to finance said loan from
Dime Bank, any other banks including banks specifically located in
Idaho.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Request No. 1 above.
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DATED this

day of March, 1991.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Richard G. Allen
Craig L. Taylor
Stephen C. Tingey
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SCT+1294
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